The earliest candidate to explain why high powered incentives are rare is that high powered contracts impose risk on workers (Holmstrom, 1979) . Consider the contract that induces efficient effort above: β y = 1. The objective of the firm is to maximize profits subject to the worker's willingness to take the position. This implies that the fixed component, β 0 , is changed to guarantee that agents earn their reservation utility, so the principal's objective becomes a surplus maximization exercise. When the worker is risk neutral, the fixed component is reduced sufficiently such that the total compensation cost is U * + c 2 . In words, the only cost that the employer incurs in addition to U * is the effort cost. This is not true when the worker is risk averse. In the context of the preferences V above, compensation costs increase when incentive contracts are used for two reasons -the cost of increased effort as above, but also a risk cost imposed on workers. Both costs are increasing in β y . With exponential preferences and linear contracts, this tradeoff results in the optimal contract being β * y = 1 1+rcσ 2 y . This approach to studying incentive contracting has become knows as the "tradeoff of risk and incentives", where firms tradeoff the benefits of great effort with higher compensation costs induced by a risk premium, such that the chosen level of effort becomes below the level that internalizes benefits to others. Only in the case where there is either no measurement error (σ 2 y = 0) or risk neutrality (r = 0) does efficient effort arise.
At its most general, this costliness of exposing a worker to large degrees of risk (or its analog, liquidity constraints) surely explains some part of the absence of high powered incentives. In much the same way as financial assets with higher undiversifiable risk require higher expected returns, so also are risky jobs likely to demand higher compensation. designed on the subset of things that can be measured, there is a danger that they ignore the unmeasured aspects. For instance, there is evidence of teachers "teaching for the test" or cheating to achieve higher test scores (Jacob and Levitt, 2003) . This phenomenon has become known as multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) , which becomes potentially important when there is no single measure which reflects the contribution of an agent. Accordingly, it is not surprising that a consistent empirical finding is that jobs which are described by firms as complex tend not to offer significant incentive pay (see Prendergast, 1999, for details).
Another limitation on the ability of firms to provide incentives to workers comes from team production. Measures of performance for most workers reflect not only what they do, but also the contributions of others. In itself, this does not change the calculus above in any conceptual sense, other than that the measurement error now includes the actions of others. As an example, assume that two agents (1 and 2) work on a team and that output measures the true contributions of both plus an error term -y = e 1 +e 2 + . Efficient effort arises as before by setting β y = 1 for each worker. It is incorrect to assume that the ability to manipulate measures of performance always mute incentives -sometimes it can result in incentive pay being inefficiently high. Consider again two occupations where agents are typically residual claimants -taxi drivers and sharecroppers. At first blush, it would seem odd that they have such extreme incentives. Aren't these as likely candidates for trading off risk against incentives as any? However, one characteristic of each of these occupations is that both have opportunities for hiding output, either by taking fares without using the meter (in the case of cab drivers) or selling crops privately (in the case of farmers). In both cases, the only outcome that makes this incentive irrelevant is to render them residual claimants, even if risk considerations would suggest otherwise.
Another issue that can constrain efficient incentives, yet has received almost no attention in the empirical literature, is where agents hold private information. Take a specific instance -real estate agents. In Chicago, real estate contracts take a simple form -agents make 3% of the sales price of the house. Assume that my home is worth $500. This linear contract not only offers only 3% on the relevant margin for improving the selling price of the house, but predominantly rewards the agent for selling the house for say $450. Yet anyone could sell the house for $450 and it seems highly inefficient to reward in this way. So why not renegotiate to something better? An example of such an improvement (modulo risk issues) would be to offer nothing on the first $450, but to pay a piece rate of 30% on anything over $450. In this way, the agent has more incentives on margin, yet breaks even relative to the original contract if the house sells for its original price.
One reason why such renegotiation does not arise is that the agent may privately know the true value of the home, while the owner believes it to be worth $500 on average. Consider a homeowner who offers the new contract above to the agent. It is clear that the agent rejects the new contract if it is truly worth less than expected, and accepts it if worth more. But this implies that the agent earns information rents on average. As a result, on average the homeowner loses money from the renegotiation unless effort increases enough. This option available to the agent limits the ability of contracts to attain efficiency. Instead, in the usual monopoly fashion, the homeowner would offer a contract to tradeoff the efficiency gains of increased effort with inframarginal losses of the type described above, resulting in lower powered incentives. 3
Much of the recent literature has been focused on how incentive contracts can cause adverse behavioral responses. Another possible mechanism for such responses is where intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by the use of incentive contracts. The premise of this literature has been that in many occupations, agents enjoy carrying out the activity or care about the outcomes of their actions. As a result, they will exert effort beyond that which they can get away with even in the absence of incentive contracts. This, in itself, is not enough to limit incentive contracting.
However, there is some psychological evidence that the extent to which agents enjoy their jobs becomes weaker when incentive contracting is used. In effect, they feel that they are only doing it "for the money" and hence lose interest. A commonly cited example is the willingness of people to donate blood, where the warm feeling from donating declines when payments are made. In some instances, this can imply that incentive contracting can reduce effort if these crowding out effects are strong enough. As a result, it can be optimal to provide no incentives even when effort is one dimensional. This area of research, whose empirical testing has largely been restricted to the laboratory, is still in its early stages and is likely to see much refining over the coming years. See
Frey and Jegen, 2000, for a survey.
Another likely fruitful area of future research concerns non-monetary ways of motivating workers. This literature largely began as an exercise in how workers could be motivated to internalize the benefits of others, yet has almost exclusively become an exercise in how to motivate through monetary contracting. Yet it is clear that there are a myriad of means of motivating workers -sense of achievement, "doing good", status, etc -that firms tap into. How such mechanisms operate, and the way in which they interact with monetary contracts, remain an unstudied topic of research, though see Besley and Ghatak, 2003 , for some theoretical work on this issue.
It is worthwhile to note a caveat before concluding. The discussion above concerns the absence of observed incentive contracts. Yet workers often have unobserved carrots and sticks that can motivate them. For instance, many workers exert effort in the hope of attaining a promotion (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) , or a better job offer (Holmstrom, 1982 Yet explicit incentives are no more common for those workers than for any other.) The interaction of unobserved (typically career) incentives with the more explicit set of piece rates and bonuses that have been considered above is surely of first order importance to firms, though it remains remains surprisingly unexplored in the literature. (See Baker et al., 1994 , for an exception.)
To conclude, perhaps the most central foundation of modern economics is the idea that appropriate prices guide behavior in efficient ways. Despite this, one of the defining characteristics of the employment relationship in many firms is the absence of the kind of explicit prices where wages depend in a clear way on observed outcomes. The early incarnations of agency theory were concerned with returning prices in a way that could serve to fully internalize the effects of agents' actions on the welfare of their employers. Yet this initial optimism has now been tempered with a somewhat more nuanced view that shows tradeoffs that will ultimately help in defining more precisely the nature of labor market relationships.
